I will quote extensively from his comments and bold the comments that I believe are important to note. This financial report is extremely relevant to the upcoming income tax increase on the ballot May 4th. For more information on that subject, see my posts on the income tax increase (Grand Rapids Tax Increase: It’s the Pensions Stupid, and Grand Rapids Fires Police, Firefighters, Keeps Parking Lot Sweepers).

By approving this tax increase, the taxpayers of the city will simply be kicking the can down the road one more year. As I’ve already demonstrated, if the tax increase passes, the city will be forced to come back again next year for even more money because the pension plans are killing the city’s budget.

Here are CFO Scott Buhrer’s comments. I know it’s long, but reading it is a must for all city residents:

Today it is obvious that the U.S. economy has far more capacity to produce goods and services than the demand for those goods and service. So any increase in demand will result in little price change. This will be the case until our underemployment rate of over 17% (the U6 measure) drops by a considerable amount and we begin to use our factories well above our current 72% utilization rate. In his book The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008, Paul Krugman, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, correctly predicted that monetary policy (i.e. zero interest rates) would not lead us out of this financial crisis, and subsequently, as a columnist for the New York Times, Krugman has written of his belief that much more federal stimulus funding is required. But, at the end of the day, can you solve a problem that at its very heart emanates from excessive debt by continuing to fuel demand underwritten by government debt?

Over the last year I have provided assessments of National, State, and local economies. On September 15th I reported that the federal government had spent, lent or committed $12.8 trillion, an amount that approaches the value of everything produced in the United States last year (i.e. Gross Domestic Product, or GDP).

Which brings us to today. Irrespective of whether the economic recovery has begun or not, the United States (and much of the rest of the industrialized world for that matter), will face a long and difficult stretch of time as we deal with the excessive debt levels that have been accumulated over the past two decades.

The 19th-century British journalist Walter Bagehot claimed that during each speculative upturn merchants and bankers “believe that the prosperity they see will last always, that it is only the beginning of greater prosperity.” A boom in U.S. stocks in the early 1900’s was remembered by Alexander Dana Noyes, the financial editor of the New York Times in the 1920’s, as “the first of such speculative demonstrations in history which based its ideas and conduct on the assumption that we were living in a New Era; that old rules and principles and precedents of finance were obsolete; that things could be done safely today which had been dangerous and impossible in the past.” This mode of wishful thinking has continued up to the present day.

Instead of providing beneficial warning, economists have more often played the role of enablers during each successive New Era. The noted and early neoclassical economist whose work is perhaps more respected now than when he was alive, Irving Fisher of Yale, notoriously opined in September 1929 that stocks had reached a “permanently high plateau,” justifying this view with the claim that Prohibition had enhanced worker productivity and that businesses were employing new “scientific” management practices.

More recently, just a few short years ago, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and a number of other academic economists hailed the “Great Moderation,” arguing that rising institutional debt levels were tolerable, thanks to better monetary policy and better risk reducing financial innovations. During the boom years, Mr. Bernanke pronounced that rising house prices were a sign of improved economic fundamentals rather than speculative excess. It turns out that the Great Moderation was, in fact, a trap – a time of overindulgence of borrowing and risk-taking that would eventually destroy wealth rather than create it. Financial catastrophe is invariably preceded by periods of prosperity and New Era rationalizations.

The same Irving Fisher first highlighted the fact that an economy’s debt level could have harmful impacts on the economic growth, if it is excessive. In 1933 Fisher published his debt deflation theory that pointed out that the contraction of debt levels (which is currently occurring) usually results in prolonged economic distress. Borrowing binges invariably unwind, often quite precipitously, with sharp declines in asset prices, consumption, and high unemployment.

Housing prices are a remarkably accurate predictor of banking crises. Banking crises often follow periods of financial liberalization or deregulation. For all its “this-time-is-different hubris”, the United States has proved no exception. Rapidly rising housing prices should have set off alarm bells. Especially when the cumulative real price (i.e. inflation adjusted) increase in the United States between 1995 and 2006 rose 92%, more than three times the 27% gain for the preceding 100 or so years – and the total value of mortgages reached 90% of GDP. In 2005 alone, at the height of the bubble, real housing prices rose more than 12%, which was six times the rate of GDP growth.

International institutions (e.g. the International Monetary Fund) might help avert crises by promoting greater transparency in reporting financial data. Although it’s better than most, the United States government “runs an extraordinarily opaque accounting system.” In the past two years, the federal government (including the Federal Reserve) added huge off-balance-sheet guarantees and trillions of dollars of difficult-to-price assets to its books – and to date the Federal Reserve has refused to disclose details about these assets to the U.S. Congress. Bloomberg (a media company providing business and financial news and information) has sued in an attempt to compel disclosure.

What we do know is that Congress authorized up to $300 billion to bail out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Quietly, on Christmas Eve, Treasury pledged unlimited support for the two agencies, without any additional Congressional approval.

Financial over-indulgence knows no boundaries and has no expiration date. Human nature is at the heart of the financial disasters. A recurring theme: investors, lenders and policymakers repeatedly delude themselves during economic booms into thinking that business cycles have been repealed and that the good times will go on and on. Indeed, after the recent financial collapse, 140 banks failed in 2009. If you think banking failures are declining and the financial crisis is over, consider this: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) board recently voted to approve the 2010 budget, which includes $2.5 billion for staffing to resolve failed banks taken over by the agency. That does not include the cost of winding up the affairs of these failed banks, which is almost impossible to estimate. That FDIC budget for staffing to resolve the affairs of the failed institutions is up 92% from $1.3 billion in 2009. The hiring plans will bring the number of FDIC employees to 8,653. Sheila Bair, Chairman of the FDIC, said the budget approved for 2010 “will ensure that we are prepared to handle an even larger number of bank failures next year, if that becomes necessary and to provide regulatory oversight for an even larger number of troubled institutions.” The number of problem banks on the FDIC’s confidential list as of September 30th more than doubled to 552 – the highest level in 16 years – up from 250 at the start of the year.

Three important factors pertain to the present situation in the United States and the world.

First, when debt becomes excessive, regardless of whether the government or the private sector is accumulating the debt, countries lose the ability to grow their way out of the problem; they must go through the time consuming and often painful processes of debt repayment and increased savings.

Second, whether the debt is owed externally or internally is not as critical as the excessiveness of the debt. Economic damage occurs as a result of extreme over-leverage, whether the barometer of performance is economic output, the labor markets, or asset prices.

Third, government actions, even involving sizable sums of money, are far less helpful than they appear. Further increasing government debt to solve the problem of over-indebtedness in the private sector only leads to greater systemic risk and general economic underperformance.

The question that is currently being debated is “are we headed for massive inflation or deflation”? As is widely feared here in the U.S., many countries have had the right
circumstances and mechanisms to inflate away their debt overhang, and, in fact, have done so by debasing their currency. This approach poses the most risk to those individuals who are on fixed incomes. Those particular circumstances, however, are not currently present in the United States, not with underemployment in excess of 17% and industrial capacity utilization at 72%.

I view the present inflationary environment as benign because: 1) the U.S. economic system is overleveraged and academic research confirms that this circumstance leads to deflation; 2) monetary policy is, and will continue to be, ineffectual as efforts to spur growth are thwarted by declining asset prices, loan destruction, and adverse regulatory influences; and 3) the federal government’s stimulus spending will ultimately lead to increased taxes and governmental borrowings must inevitably rise, further stunting any economic growth. These factors ensure that inflation will remain contained. Interest rates easily can and do rise for short periods, but remaining elevated in a disinflationary environment is contrary to the historical experience. If we do see higher interest rates it could be coupled with stagflation.

Fisher’s 1933 “Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions” and modern “quantitative” methods have now essentially confirmed this conclusion: over-indebtedness and major contractions, particularly those that involve geographical regions (or in the present situation, extend worldwide) lead to deflation, not inflation.

The U.S. response and the world-wide response to the financial crisis have been remarkable.

But, we may find that at the end of the road, the cure could be as deadly as the illness. In 2009 the book This Time is Different – Eight Centuries of Financial Folly by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff compiled a database by looking at over 250 financial crises in 66 countries over a period of 800 years. The common theme in explaining the crises is that debt was excessive relative to national income (GDP). They make the compelling case that this old rule still applies and this time is not different. After studying data spanning 800 years, Reinhart and Rogoff characterize the current financial crisis as the “ Second Great Contraction.”

Broadly speaking, financial crises are protracted affairs. More often than not, the aftermath of severe financial crises such as the one that we are currently experiencing, share three characteristics:

First, asset market collapses are deep and prolonged. Declines in real housing prices average 35% stretched out over six years, whereas equity price collapses average 56% over a downturn of about three and a half years.

Second, the aftermath of banking crises is associated with profound declines in output and employment. The unemployment rate rises an average of seven percentage points during the down phase of the cycle, which lasts on an average more than four years. Output falls (from peak to trough) more than 9% on average, although the duration of the downturn, averaging roughly two years, is considerably shorter than that of unemployment.

Third, the amount of government debt tends to explode; it rose an average of 86% (in real terms, relative to pre-crisis debt) in the major post-World War II episodes. The main cause of debt explosions is not the widely cited costs of bailing out and recapitalizing the banking system. The upper-bound estimates of the banking bailout costs pale next to actual measured increases in public debt. The biggest driver of the governmental debt increase is the inevitable collapse in tax revenues that governments suffer in the wake of deep and prolonged output contractions.

The Reinhart and Rogoff book is very sobering. It provides extensive empirical data that supports my belief that we have a lot of pain left to experience because of the bad choices our nation has made. We, in this case, is the entire developed industrialized world, and the emerging world will suffer, too, as we go through it. It is not a matter of pain or no pain. There is now no way to avoid it. It is simply a matter of when and over how long a period. The lesson of history, then, is that even as the economy and financial institutions improve, there will always be a temptation to stretch the limits. Just as an individual can go bankrupt no matter how rich she starts out, a financial system can collapse under the pressure of greed, politics, and profits no matter how well regulated it seems to be.

Yet the ability of governments and investors to delude themselves, giving rise to periodic bouts of euphoria that usually end in tears, seems to have remained a constant. No careful reader of Friedman and Schwartz will be surprised by this lesson about the ability of governments to mismanage financial markets, a key theme of their analysis. As for financial markets, we have come full circle to the concept of financial fragility in economies with massive indebtedness.

All too often, periods of heavy borrowing can take place in a bubble and last for a surprisingly long time. This time may seem different, but all too often a deeper look shows it is not. Deficit spending only provides a transitory boost to the economy. It initially raises GDP, as it did in the second half of 2009, but then the effect dissipates and later is reversed, as financial resources available to the private sector are reduced.

Conclusion

The enormous amount of federal borrowing and stimulus programs are likely to serve to restrict long-term economic growth. The slow U.S. economic growth environment will obviously lead to continuing budget challenges for the City and the State. If we continue to push expenses into future years it will assure that our future will be challenging even if the economy improves.

However, the bottom line is this: 100% of the tax increase will go directly into the city’s retirement pension system. This system is rapidly becoming unsustainable for a couple of reasons, which I’ll outline below. The city manager is trying to make the case that this tax increase will somehow increase fire department coverage downtown, but that’s a smokescreen to distract voters from the real fiscal disaster waiting in the wings.

The first, and most obvious reason for the sudden pension crisis is, of course, the current Great Recession. We’re lucky in that the city publishes lots of information on their pension plans. You can peruse the information here: City of Grand Rapids – Retirement Systems. We can glean several things from the monthly pension reports. The graph below summarizes the balances of the pension funds.

The city maintains two pension funds. One is for the police and fire employees, the other (general) for all other employees. As of December 31, 2007, the combined balance of both funds was $753 million. As of December 31, 2008, the combined balance was $493 million, a stunning loss of $260 million, or -35%. This tells us important information. Much of the city’s pension funds are clearly invested in risky assets, probably equities (stocks). For comparison, the S&P 500 stock index dropped 38% during the same period. This is an example of how the city’s bureaucrats can promise bigger and bigger pension benefits during the good times. Since the pension fund obviously is sensitive to the market’s ups and downs, the good times inflate the value of the pension funds, making it look like it’s easier to offer better and better benefits without having to increase the city’s costs.

But, then comes reality, crashing things down. When the market began to tank in 2007, it took the city’s pension fund with it. This sort of drop slaughters the pension fund’s solvency, and this is why the city must now contribute much more money just to keep the fund afloat. Of course, you’ll notice that the fund has recovered, as of December 31, 2009, to the level of $590 million. This is an increase of approximately 20%, while the S&P 500 increased by 27% during the same period. The problem is that the current market rise has run out of steam. Over the last three months, the market is essentially flat and appears to have entered a new down trend.

If the city had simply invested in safer and more stable securities, such as US government bonds, the funds would be in far better shape. For instance, if the pension fund were invested in 30 year treasury bonds, the annual return would have been about 4.5%. Compounded annually, the city’s pension funds would stand at about $836 million today, instead of $590 million (or a loss of around $246 million). But, a safe and secure growth rate like this would have constrained the city’s ability to offer greater and greater levels of benefits. A conservative and thoughtful path of sustainable benefits was possible, but the city’s leaders chose not to got that way.

So, what are the real consequences and costs of this problem? The graph below shows us the increase in the city’s pension system contribution costs.

As you can see, the pension contribution cost is estimated to be $5.009 million this fiscal year (2010). This will increase to an estimated $26.66 million cost in 2015. That’s a whopping 532% increase in just five years. Again, that’s assuming a 7.5% stock market growth rate, so the reality may be much worse. But the important point of data is the difference in pension contribution costs between the current year and next year (2011). As stated, the current year’s pension cost is about $5 million. Next year’s is estimated to be $12.019 million. An increased cost of $7.01 million. Wait a minute. Where have I heard that number before? Ah, yes. Here:

News Headline: “Grand Rapids income tax increase could raise $7 million”

What’s the logical conclusion? The entire tax increase will be spent on pensions. Oh, and that’s just the first year. In 2012 the increased pension cost will be another $4 million. The year after that, an additional $3.5 million, and so on. By 2015, the city will have to raise taxes by $21 million a year, or three times more than the proposed tax increase, just to pay for pensions.

Are you ready to pony up?

But wait, there’s more. Before readers try to make the argument that things would be fine without the current stock market conditions, please look deeper into the pension funds’ built-in collapse. That’s right – built-in collapse. This is the second reason for the current pension crisis.

It’s been in front of our city leaders, but they have chosen not to deal with it. What am I talking about? The city receives an annual report on the pension system’s health. You can read these reports here. The chart below is taken from this report (click on the chart to view it full size).

This chart shows us the number of active employees at the city who are participating in the pension plan versus the number of retired employees who are drawing benefits. This is generally referred to an active/retired employee ratio. In 1975 there were approximately 2.6 active employees for each retired employee. This means that the contributions made on behalf of the active employees were likely higher than the benefits being drawn by retired employees. Contrast this with the current ratio of close to one active employee for each retired employee. This means that active employees’ and the city’s pension contributions are likely just going straight out the door to pay for currently-retired employees. This trend will result in failure. It’s the same principal as a Ponzi Scheme. Current “investments” just go right out to the door to pay benefits to others.

The following chart (from the same report) shows us the cost of pension benefits as a percentage of current employees’ payroll (click to view full size):

This is the cost of unsustainable defined-benefit pension plans. As you can see, in 1975, the city contributed $5 for every $100 in payroll. This cost has ballooned to nearly $45 per $100 of payroll cost. You are now seeing exactly why the city budget has been squeezed. Even with fewer employees and a relatively flat budget, the city continually runs out of money and is forced to cut services.

We, as citizens, are seeing a degradation of basic city services so that pensions can be fully funded.

To put a cherry on top, the below is an excerpt from the pension report (Page B-1):

Voluntary Retirement. A member may retire after 30 years of service regardless of age, or after attaining age 62 and completing 8 years of service. Effective January 1, 2001, members covered by the Emergency Communications Operators Bargaining Unit, after attaining age 55 and completing 8 years of service. [emphasis added]

This means that if you’re 62 and have worked for the city for only eight years, you get a lifetime pension. If you’re part of the Emergency Communications Operators union, you can retire at 55 after only eight years of service. And you’ll notice that this was approved as recently as 2001 by our city’s leaders. The problem was compounded that recently. Now they think that citizens should pay for this through higher taxes.

The end result is that, due to our city leaders’ absolute failure to manage finances well, they are trying to push the cost off onto taxpayers without doing anything to address the underlying problem. The politicians find it easier to raise taxes than deal with angry unions – and that’s exactly what they are doing again. The city commission is afraid to tackle the real problem, so the easier path is to “kick the can down the road” and try and deal with it later. The problem is that eventually you are forced to deal with it. Instead of dealing with the issue when it was easy to manage, the city has gone beyond the point of being able to fix it without disruption. The current path of the city’s pension fund is bankruptcy.

It’s easy to spend and make promises when the times are good. But now the residents (and taxed non-residents) of Grand Rapids are being asked to pay for the politicians’ and bureaucrats’ inability to think ahead and act in their fiduciary capacity as representatives of the citizenry. Who do they work for? The city’s unions or the city’s citizens?

• UPDATE: See also Grand Rapids Fired Police, Firefighters; Keeps Parking Lot Sweepers.
• UPDATE 2: The Grand Rapids Income Tax Increase Scam is Getting Worse

Grand Rapids Pensions: Thanks Taxpayers!